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855 
ROBERTS V. TISHMAN SPEYER 
PROPERTIES: A SOURCE OF FALSE HOPE 




On the evening of October 16, 2006, the broker charged 
with selling Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village (“Stuy 
Town”) called Rob Speyer of Tishman Speyer Properties.1 The 
broker instructed Speyer to gather BlackRock Inc., Tishman 
Speyer’s partner in its bid to buy Stuy Town, as well as his 
team of bankers and lawyers, and rush over to her office, 
entering the building in groups of two in order to remain 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A. Bates College, 
2004. I would like to thank my family for their ongoing support and 
encouragement. Thanks to Kathleen Christatos, Jill Wexler, Sarah Castle and 
Jon Sabin, as well as the entire Journal of Law and Policy staff, for their 
edits and assistance throughout the writing process. Finally, I owe a debt of 
gratitude to Marty Needelman and Joanne Koslofsky for introducing me to 
the world of New York City housing law and to Professor David Reiss, who 
generously offered me his time and invaluable insights. 
1 The specifics of this deal were originally reported by Charles V. Bagli 
in the New York Times. Charles V. Bagli, Megadeal: Inside a New York 
Real Estate Coup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/business/yourmoney/31speyer.html 
[hereinafter Megadeal]. Rob Speyer is the son of, and heir apparent to, Jerry 
Speyer, the CEO of Tishman Speyer Properties, a preeminent property 
developer and owner, and was the Tishman Speyer representative in charge 
of the deal. Id.; Charles DuBow, The World’s Biggest Real Estate Deal, 
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
bwdaily/dnflash/content/oct2006/db20061017_682643.htm?chan=top+news_t
op+news+index_businessweek+exclusives. 
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inconspicuous.2 The next morning, the Tishman Speyer 
Properties and BlackRock Inc. partnership (“the Owners”) 
completed the biggest real estate deal of all time, making a $400 
million deposit on a $5.4 billion dollar deal for 110 buildings 
and 11,232 apartments on 80 acres of prime Manhattan land.3 
The deal attracted significant publicity.4 The sale, forged at the 
apex of the housing boom, offered bidders a rare opportunity in 
Manhattan’s tight real estate market: to acquire a huge number 
of apartments where rents were only a third to a half of market 
rates, thus leaving room for the owner to significantly increase 
the rent.5 Across the city, Stuy Town tenants and tenant 
advocates feared the apartments would be rapidly removed from 
rent regulation, legally and illegally, because doing so would be 
the only possible way to ultimately turn a profit on the deal.6 
The transaction represented a new breed of real estate deals, 
dubbed “predatory equity” transactions because the deals are 
backed by private equity.7 Predatory equity means investing 
                                                          
2 Megadeal, supra note 1. 
3 DuBow, supra note 1. The record price before this $5.4 billion 
purchase had been approximately $1.9 billion, when Tishman Speyer 
purchased Rockefeller Center. Id.; Megadeal, supra note 1. There were eight 
other bidders who competed for the Stuy Town deal. Megadeal, supra note 
1. A tenant coalition was one of the bidders, offering $4.5 billion and 
promising to preserve 20 percent of the units as rent-regulated rentals while 
selling 20 percent to tenants at below-market prices. Id.   
4 Megadeal, supra note 1. Some bidders believed the deal to be too big 
to sustain itself and warned that the overleveraged terms of the deal could 
haunt the Tishman Speyer/BlackRock partnership in the future. Id. Tenant 
activists, for their part, worried that the $500,000 per apartment purchase 
price would require the new owners to aggressively move to deregulate 
apartments and raise rents. Id. Both the critics’ and the tenants’ prophesies 
ultimately came true. See Lingling Wei & Craig Karmin, An Apartment 
Complex Teeters, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at M12, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125547827547583747.html?mod=rss_Today’
s_Most_Popular.  
5 Megadeal, supra note 1. 
6 David Jones, Predatory Equity, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 17, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-jones/predatory-equity_b_289172.html. 
7 TOM WATERS & VICTOR BACH, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y OF N.Y., CLOSING 
THE DOOR 2008: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING LOSSES IN A WEAKENED MARKET 9 
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equity to buy rental apartments at inflated prices with the 
intention of replacing low- and middle-income tenants with new 
tenants who can afford much higher rents, thus enabling the 
investors to earn large profits.8 New York City’s housing 
advocates and elected officials believe this speculative practice9 
threatens the city’s affordable housing stock10 and they have 
worked to oppose the practice.11In New York, predatory equity 
has already put vast numbers of apartments at risk of being 
removed from rent regulation protections. Ninety thousand 
units12 of affordable, rent regulated housing have already been 
purchased by predatory equity purchasers and removing these 
                                                          
(2008), http://www.cssny.org/userimages/downloads/CSS_Report_Closing 
TheDoor_08.pdf. Private equity firms essentially engage in leveraged buy-
outs, using borrowed money to buy what they deem to be undervalued assets, 
improve the assets and sell them for profit. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, Profits 
for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05 
simmons.html. 
8 TOM WATERS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y OF N.Y., GETTING STARTED ON 
PREDATORY EQUITY RESEARCH IN YOUR CITY  (2009), http://www.cssny. 
org/userimages/downloads/Getting%20Started%20on%20Predatory%20Equity
%20Research%20in%20Your%20City%20May%202009.pdf.  
9 These deals are “speculative” because the purchase prices and 
mortgages of the apartments are based on what the rent rolls ultimately might 
be able to support, not what they currently support. See infra Part I.A. 
10 New York, as one of the few American cities that has a large amount 
of rent regulated apartments, provides investors with a unique opportunity to 
profit from the predatory model. Gretchen Morgenson, Questions of Rent 
Tactics by Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/business/09rent.html?pagewanted=all. 
Rent regulated apartments make up 57 percent of Bronx apartments, 42 
percent of Brooklyn apartments, 59 percent of Manhattan apartments, 43 
percent of Queens apartments and 15 percent of Staten Island apartments. Id. 
11 WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 12, 33. On December 2, 2009, 
New York City announced the formation of a “Predatory Equity Task Force” 
to monitor issues related to the burst of the housing bubble as they arise and 
mobilize to protect tenants when necessary. Press Release, N.Y. City 
Council, Council Announces New Predatory Equity Task Force Following 
Sale of Ocelot Portfolio (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://council.nyc.gov/ 
html/releases/equity_tf_12_2_09.shtml. 
12 In this Comment “apartment” and “unit” will be used interchangeably. 
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units from the rent regulation scheme is at the heart of the 
predatory equity business model.13  
In many ways, the Stuy Town deal exemplifies the predatory 
equity model and illustrates the high stakes involved for 
landlords and tenants.14 By 2008, following the housing bubble 
burst and the concurrent global economic downturn, Stuy 
Town’s investors’ worst fears came true: the complex was in 
danger of imminent default.15 On October 22, 2009, in Roberts 
v. Tishman Speyer Properties, the New York Court of Appeals 
added to the Owners’ financial problems.16 The court ruled that 
the Owners17 had improperly removed thousands of units from 
rent regulation and charged market rates while simultaneously 
receiving tax abatements from New York City through the “J-51 
program.”18 Reaction from interested parties has been swift: Pro-
                                                          
13 ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., THE NEXT SUB-PRIME 
LOAN CRISIS: HOW PREDATORY EQUITY INVESTMENT IS UNDERMINING NEW 
YORK’S AFFORDABLE MULTI-FAMILY RENTAL HOUSING 2, 4 (2008) 
http://www.anhd.org/resources/the%20next%20sub-prime%20loan%20crisis. 
pdf [hereinafter NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS]. One housing developer 
explains the scale of predatory equity: “During the past four years nearly one 
tenth of the entire rent regulated housing stock in New York City was bought 
by institutional investors, which is the equivalent of housing for one-third of 
the population of Washington, D.C. or Boston.” Donald P. Cogsville, 
Affordable Housing: Private Equity Solution to Predatory Equity, 55 REAL 
EST. WKLY. (2008), available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/ 
article/191645824.html. 
14 There are, however, critical differences between the Stuy Town deal 
and other predatory equity deals. See infra Part I.C. 
15 Wei & Karmin, supra note 4. The Owners have since defaulted—on 
Monday, January 25, 2010, they announced that they would return the 
property to their creditors. Charles V. Bagli, New York Housing Complex is 
Turned Over to Creditors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/nyregion/25stuy.html?dbk. 
16 See generally Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 
900, 902 (N.Y. 2009). 
17 Defendants in the case included Stuy Town’s former owners as well: 
Metropolitan Life and Annuity Company and Metropolitan Tower Life 
Insurance Company (“Former Owners”). Id. 
18 Id. The “J-51” program provides tax abatements to owners who 
renovate or rehabilitate their properties in certain ways. N.Y. CITY, N.Y. 
ADMIN. CODE § 11-242 (2008); see infra Part II.B.   
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tenant groups call the decision correct and highlight the injustice 
resulting from years of improper interpretation of the statutes at 
issue.19 Pro-landlord voices, on the other hand, cite the 
decision’s unfairness, given that landlords, housing agencies and 
tenants merely followed the rules—now deemed to be illegal—
for many years.20 One thing, however, is clear: this landmark 
                                                          
19 Nicholas Jahr, A Matter of Interpretation: How Will Court View J-51?, 
CITY LIMITS WKLY., June. 22, 2009, available at http://www.citylimits.org/ 
content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?articlenumber=3764. 
20 A Daily News editorial is reflective of opposition to the decision: 
Housing agencies wrote volumes of regulations based on the plain 
sense of the law. Thousands of landlords invested in residential 
buildings based on the regulatory decrees. Millions of tenants signed 
leases that were based on the same understanding. And the state 
Legislature reauthorized vacancy decontrol by adjusting its economic 
terms and leaving the word “become” intact.  
. . . .  
. . . [T]he court has established that it is blithely willing to hammer 
business people and property owners who invested billions of dollars 
in residential properties and took out mortgages based on the rent 
rules as the regulations were officially interpreted.  
Editorial, A Court Out of Control: Jurists Impose Their Screwy Judgment on 
City’s Rent Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/11/02/2009-11-02_a_court_out_ 
of_control_jurists_impose_their_screwy_judgment_on_citys_rent_rules.html. 
The real estate industry, however, appeared to be selling two conflicting 
storylines in the immediate aftermath of the decision. On the one hand, they 
spoke of it as a doomsday scenario: Steven Spinola, president of the Real 
Estate Board of New York said, “It’s a terrible decision” and explained that, 
“[t]his is another example of rent regulations basically throwing a little bit of 
havoc and a little bit of fear into property owners and financial institutions.” 
Lingling Wei & Dawn Wotapka, Court Shakes up New York Landlords, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB125622172790601315.html. On the other hand, the industry 
appeared to try and play down the repercussions of the decision, almost as if 
to contain the fall-out. One article, sardonically titled “Shock! Landlords Will 
Survive Stuy-Town Verdict” quoted the very same Mr. Spinola as saying, 
“It’s certainly bad for [some], but it’s not a decision that will affect tens of 
thousands of apartments.” Theresa Agovino & Amanda Fung, Landlords Will 
Survive Stuy-Town Verdict!, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20091023/FREE/910239986 
[hereinafter Landlords Will Survive Stuy-Town Verdict] (alteration in 
SPIRER REVISED.DOC 6/28/2010  3:43 PM 
860 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
decision will have far-reaching implications for a group of New 
York City tenants and landlords of buildings that have been 
removed from rent regulation while the landlords received J-51 
tax breaks from the city. The critical question, then, is just how 
far-reaching this decision’s implications will ultimately be.21  
This Comment argues that, while the Roberts decision 
represents a significant victory for tenants whose landlords have 
simultaneously taken advantage of the deregulation benefits and 
J-51 tax abatements, it will ultimately have very little impact on 
ending predatory equity practices. Despite tenants’ hopes to the 
contrary, the Roberts decision does not indicate a populist, anti-
Wall Street trend on the part of the courts, but rather a ruling 
limited to a very narrow issue of statutory interpretation.22 In 
fact, despite a number of events that would seem to deter 
predatory equity investment,23 this model persists, albeit in a 
                                                          
original). 
21 Theresa Agovino & Amanda Fung, Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants 
Huge Victory, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www. 
crainsnewyork.com/article/20091022/FREE/910229993/1072 [hereinafter 
Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants Huge Victory].   
22 Daniel Geiger, In the End, J-51 Case Came Down to the Interpretation 
of Just a Few Words, REAL EST. WKLY., Oct. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.rew-online.com/news/story.aspx?id=776. Real estate experts 
believe that there may be a maximum of 80,000 units where the owners have 
taken advantage of J-51 benefits, while simultaneously deregulating their 
apartments. Id. Other industry experts put the number at 90,000. NEXT SUB-
PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 2. Moreover, only 27,708 of these 
80,000 or 90,000 apartments are in buildings considered to be current victims 
of predatory equity deals. See supra note 19. 
23 These factors include the Roberts decision; an active tenant rights 
movement, Linda Collins, Tenants of Brooklyn Apartments Protest 
Conditions, Harassment, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 3, 2009, available 
at http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?id=31704; the 
passage of a tenant protection law in New York City, see Prometheus Realty 
v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 2009, at 38, (col. 1); political 
pressure, Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Reveals: So-
Called “Predatory Equity” Deals Just Like Subprime Loans but for Entire 
NYC Housing Complexes—Developers Cook the Books to Reap Millions and 
Leave Tenants in the Lurch (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://schumer. 
senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=305397; and fallout in the mortgage-
backed securities market, Sam Chandan, Investors and Stuy Town, N.Y. 
SPIRER REVISED.DOC 6/28/2010  3:43 PM 
 ROBERTS V. TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES 861 
modified form.24 This new form is characterized by deals that 
are still speculative but merely less so than the deals made at the 
height of the housing bubble.25 Ultimately, ending this dangerous 
speculative model will require much stronger comprehensive 
regulation, at the state or national level, that prevents future 
deals from being made, or the removal of the incentives—like 
luxury decontrol—that allow developers to rapidly raise rents to 
market rate.26  
In this Comment, Part I will introduce the recent 
phenomenon of predatory equity, a real estate trend necessary 
for understanding the Roberts decision, and its implications. Part 
II will provide an overview of relevant law concerning New 
York City’s complex and overlapping rent regulation and tax 
abatement schemes. Part III will evaluate the opinion of the 
Roberts court, with a particular focus on whether the case was 
properly decided. Finally, Part IV will provide a detailed 
analysis of the Roberts decision’s potential implications on 
predatory equity practices in New York City. 
I. PREDATORY EQUITY: A NEW MODEL FOR MULTIFAMILY27 
APARTMENT TRANSACTIONS 
A. Underlying Financial Model 
In order to understand the Roberts decision in context, it is 
helpful to consider the structure of a predatory equity deal. 
                                                          
OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://neptune.observer.com/2009/ 
commercial-observer/investors-and-stuy-town#. 
24 ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PREDATORY EQUITY: 
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS 20–22 (2009), available at http://www.anhd.org/ 
resources/Predatory_Equity-Evolution_of_a_Crisis_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS]. “Vulture funds,” which are investment funds that 
deal with distressed assets, appear poised to take advantage of investment 
opportunities in the New York City multifamily housing market as banks sell 
off predatory equity debt at discount prices. Id; see infra, Part III.B. 
25 EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24. 
26 WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 12–13. 
27 The term “multifamily” apartment refers to an apartment building that 
contains multiple apartment units. 
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Predatory equity deals involve buying rental apartments at prices 
not supported by the income produced from rent at the time of 
sale, in hopes of aggressively removing apartments from rent 
regulation, raising rents to market rates and increasing the 
building’s profit-making potential.28 Poor underwriting standards 
and the securitization of debt characterize these deals.29 Tenant 
advocates criticize the underwriting terms for these mortgage-
backed securities as being risky, not conforming to industry 
standards, and requiring the property owner to double or triple 
the rent in order to cover the debt service.30 The problem with 
this model, explains a director of the bond-rating agency 
Realpoint, is that “[t]he apartments are just not generating 
revenues anywhere close to market rents. Yet, they were 
underwritten as if they were.”31 Property owners, then, must 
aggressively replace rent regulated tenants with those that can 
pay market rates.32 Still, securitization fails to discourage lenders 
from making risky loans because it allows private equity 
                                                          
28 WATERS, supra note 8. 
29 Securitization refers to “the process by which a mortgage lender 
bundles together a large group of mortgages and sells certificates in that 
group of mortgages to investors.” NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 
13, at 4–5. 
30 Id. at 6. The term “debt service” refers, in this case, to the owners’ 
monthly mortgage payments. Investipedia.com, Debt Service, http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/d/debtservice.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
31 Charles V. Bagli, Mortgage Crisis is Foreseen in Housing Owned by 
Private Equity Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/nyregion/06default.html. 
32 NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 5–8. The term sheets 
outline a “recapturing” strategy, where the property owner must convert 
regulated apartments into market rate units in order to pay the debt service. 
Id. at 6. In a prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) for a group of buildings that one developer, Vantage Properties, owns 
in Washington Heights, the underwriting terms read, “[Vantage Properties] 
anticipates to recapture approximately 20–30% of the units [within the first 
year], and 10% a year thereafter” to afford the debt service on its loan. Id. at 
5 (first alteration added). This is problematic because the annual rate of 
turnover for rent-regulated buildings is only 5.6% according to the Rent 
Guidelines Board and only 1% of the apartments in these buildings were 
vacant when the loan was made. Id. 
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companies to quickly recover the value of the loan and pass the 
risk of default to the security investors.33  
B. Impact on Renters 
Typically, New York’s residential real estate in working-
class neighborhoods is a fairly non-liquid asset that returns a 7–
8% per year rate of profit, which makes it a relatively low-
pressure, low-competition business.34 When private equity funds 
invest in an asset, however, they must offer a competitive rate 
of return—14%–20% annually.35 In the residential real estate 
rental context, this rate is impossible to return without forcing 
out tenants who pay below-market rents.36 Accordingly, legal 
service providers and tenant advocates have reported drastic 
increases in tenant harassment in predatory equity buildings.37 
New York City responded to the crisis and passed Local Law 7, 
which provides tenants with a new, explicit cause of action in 
Housing Court for harassment.38  
                                                          
33 Id. at 4–5, 8. Of the 90,000 New York City units recently purchased 
by private equity-backed developers, principal mortgage loans have been 
securitized in about 40% of them. Id. at 5. 
34 EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 7. 
35 Id. 
36 Morgenson, supra note 10. To give just one example, Vantage 
Properties, which recently paid over $1 billion to invest in 9,500 rent-
regulated apartments in New York City, filed almost one thousand cases in 
housing court against tenants in a seventeen month period, as compared to 
previous landlords who had never filed more than 350 actions in a year. Id. 
37 NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 2–4. Harassment 
strategies include: notifying tenants that their leases are being canceled, 
alleging that they sublet the apartments illegally, wrongfully suing tenants 
multiple times for unpaid rent, and erroneously claiming that tenants had 
never paid their security deposits despite having lived in the building for 
decades. Id. at 3–4. Compounding the impact of the high numbers of legal 
actions pursued by these owners, most tenants who are sued are not 
represented by counsel. Id. at 2. This has led many tenants to sign away their 
rights to remain in their apartment or dispute the charges against them. Id. 
38 Prometheus Realty v. City of New York, No. 111132/08, N.Y.L.J., 
Aug. 10, 2009, at 38 (col. 1). Local Law No. 7 amends Article 1 § 27-
2004(a) to add a definition of harassment, § 27-2005 to make it an explicit 
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The overleveraged nature of predatory equity deals causes 
landlords to default and can lead to foreclosure.39 A Deutsche 
Bank report predicts that the commercial real estate 
“‘refinancing crisis’ will reach an unprecedented level around 
2013, as loans that were made during the boom in 2005, 2006 
and 2007 mature and are unlikely to qualify for refinancing 
without substantial infusions of equity.”40 Rafael Cestero, the 
commissioner of the Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development (“HPD”), testified before a New York City 
Council Committee, that a “small but significant portion” of 
recently purchased multifamily buildings are likely 
overleveraged, meaning their rent does not generate enough 
income to repay the debt.41 Moreover, when a building goes into 
foreclosure, entire neighborhoods are affected.42 Therefore, the 
legal, financial and housing sectors have closely scrutinized Stuy 
Town’s struggles; it could be a harbinger of the fate of other 
buildings with similar financial structures.43 
                                                          
duty of owners not to harass their tenants and § 27-2115 to create a cause of 
action for harassment in housing court and to specify penalties for 
harassment. Id. at 2. The law was upheld when faced with a constitutional 
challenge by the landlord lobby, with New York State Supreme Court Judge 
Eileen Rakower calling the Act “a rational legislative response to what the 
City Council has determined is the potential for a growing problem of tenant 
harassment in New York City.” Id. at 5. 
39 THE NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 7. 
40 Daniel Massey, Bronx is Burning Over Failed Deals, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUS., Aug. 17, 2009, at 18.   
41 Manny Fernandez & Jennifer Lee, Struggling Landlords Leaving 
Repairs Undone, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/07/15/nyregion/15buildings.html. At the time this 
statement was made, 3,200 units in affordable housing complexes had already 
gone into foreclosure, 11,000 faced imminent foreclosure and potentially 
55,000 more units were thought to be overleveraged and in danger of 
foreclosure. Massey, supra note 40, at 2. 
42 Massey, supra note 40, at 2. 
43 See Gretchen Morgenson, All Those Little Stuyvesant Towns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
01/31/business/31gret.html. 
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C. Case Study: Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village 
In many ways, the Stuy Town deal embodies the predatory 
equity phenomenon: It was sold to private equity-backed 
investors, the purchase price was exorbitant given the asset’s 
cash-generating potential at the time of sale and the owners 
planned to proactively remove tenants they deemed to be illegal 
in order to deregulate the apartments and raise the rents to 
market rate.44 However, the Stuy Town deal is also atypical in 
many ways. First, the apartment complex is famous, historic and 
located on prime Manhattan real estate.45 Alternatively, many 
predatory equity properties are located in low-income 
neighborhoods in the outer boroughs, which means that they are 
not eligible to be removed from rent regulation because their 
rents have not reached the $2,000 mark.46 Second, the complex 
residents are decidedly middle class, as opposed to the uniformly 
low-income population that inhabits most predatory equity 
buildings.47 Stuy Town’s socioeconomic composition has enabled 
it to retain counsel, pursue litigation and even make a 
reasonable, albeit losing, bid for the properties when it came up 
for sale.48 Third, a New York City Councilman, Daniel 
                                                          
44 Megadeal, supra note 1. 
For all of the [Stuy Town] deal’s accolades, it also illuminates the 
financial leaps of faith that real estate buyers are increasingly taking. 
Once, buyers priced properties based on existing cash flow. Real 
estate executives say that calculus would have generated a 
$3.5 billion price for the two Manhattan complexes that Tishman 
Speyer bought. But buyers are now looking to the future, building 
models of anticipated cash flow when determining how much to bid. 
The Stuyvesant Town deal, with its $5.4 billion price tag, reflects 
the new math . . . .  
Id. 
45 Id. 
46 WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 11; see infra Part III.C. 
47 Id. 
48 Eliot Brown, Stuy Town’s Columbus: How a Lawyer Rediscovered an 
Arcane Rent Rule and Shook New York, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.observer.com/2009/real-estate/stuy-town’s-
columbus#. 
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Garodnick, lives in Stuy Town, providing it with a direct 
legislative advocate.49 These differences are important to 
consider when analyzing the Roberts decision’s potential 
reverberations. 
II. ROBERTS V. TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES: THE DECISION  
The Roberts decision has placed all predatory equity 
buildings in New York under greater scrutiny and the Stuy 
Town purchase is reflective of the predatory equity model. 
Therefore, despite Stuy Town’s atypical attributes, it is 
important to consider the effect the Roberts decision may have 
on the practice of predatory equity citywide.  
A. Overview and Facts 
On October 22, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals 
issued a 4-2 per curiam decision that, in affirming the Appellate 
Division decision, shook the real estate industry in New York 
City, delighted tenants and their advocates and appeared to have 
far-reaching implications on the New York rental market for 
years to come.50 At its most basic level, the court found that the 
Stuy Town owners improperly removed thousands of units from 
rent regulation while simultaneously receiving J-51 tax benefits.51   
Long before the Stuy Town sale, in 1992, the Former 
Owners began receiving J-51 benefits.52 Then, after the Rent 
                                                          
49 Jim Dwyer, What to Make of a Big Deal Gone Sour, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2009, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/ 
nyregion/04about.html?scp=5&sq=garodnick&st=cse. 
50 Bendix Anderson, The Complex That Just Became More So, CITY 
LIMITS WKLY., Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.citylimits.org/content/ 
articles/viewarticle.cfm?article_id=3827&content_type=1&media_type=3; 
Charles V. Bagli, Impact of Ruling in Stuyvesant Town Case Could Take 
Years to Determine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at A17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/nyregion/24stuytown.html [hereinafter 
Impact of Ruling]; Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3. 
51 Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3. 
52 See Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 902 
(N.Y. 2009). 
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Regulation Reform Act (RRRA) was enacted in 1993, the 
Former Owners attained approval from the New York City 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) and 
began charging market-rate rents for apartments that were 
eligible for luxury decontrol.53 In October of 2007, the 
complexes were sold to the Owners in a “top-of-the-market” 
deal for $5.4 billion.54  
Soon after the closing of the deal, nine plaintiff-tenants 
(“Tenants”) sued the Owners and Former Owners, (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as “the Owners” in the context of 
Roberts).55 The Tenants sued on behalf of a putative class of all 
current and former tenants who were charged, or would be 
charged, rents that exceeded the legal rent stabilization level at 
any time when the landlord was receiving J-51 real estate tax 
benefits.56 The tenants claimed that the Owners did not have a 
right to enjoy the benefits of rent deregulation while 
simultaneously receiving nearly $25 million in J-51 tax 
benefits.57 The Tenants asked the court for a declaration that the 
units remain rent stabilized until the J-51 tax benefits were 
scheduled to end, in 2017 or 2018. In addition, they sought a 
declaration that the Owners would follow the law when 
deregulating units and $215 million of relief in the form of rent 
overcharges and attorneys’ fees.58  
                                                          
53 See id. Luxury decontrol refers to removing an apartment from the 
rent stabilization scheme and allowing an owner to charge market rates. See 
infra Part II.B.  
54 Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3. 
55 Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 902. 
56 Id. The lawyers have since agreed to allow the case to proceed as a 
class action. Ilaina Jonas & Andre Grenon, Stuyvesant Town Owners Agree to 
Class Action Suit, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSN0319361720100204. 
57 Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 902. Tenants claimed that 4,400 of the 11,227 
apartments were illegally removed from rent stabilization and, thereafter, 
illegally subject to market rate rents. Impact of Ruling, supra note 50. 
58 Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 904.     
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B. Relevant Rent Regulation and Housing Tax Abatement 
Law 
The Roberts court called the New York State rent laws “an 
impenetrable thicket, confusing not only to laymen but to 
lawyers.”59 Below is a brief history of relevant rent regulation 
laws and their interplay with the New York City J-51 tax 
program, intended to provide the necessary background for 
understanding the Roberts decision.   
There are two statutory structures that interact in the Roberts 
case: The New York City Rent Stabilization Law (RSL)60 and 
the J-51 tax program.61 The RSL was enacted in response to 
decreasing vacancy rates and rising rents62 and is administered 
by DHCR,63 which promulgates regulations called the Rent 
Stabilization Code (RSC).64 The J-51 tax program65 provides 
                                                          
59 Id. at 913. 
60 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11 (2000). 
61 New York, N.Y., Code § 11-242 (2009). 
62 History of the Board and the Rent Regulation System, http://www. 
housingnyc.com/html/about/intro%20PDF/historyoftheboard.pdf, 29 (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter History of the Board]; Robin Reisig, Rent 
Regulation, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 2003, available at http://www. 
gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20030309/200/305. 
63 About Office of Rent Administration Operations and Services, 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, http://www.dhcr.state.ny.us/ 
Rent/about.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
64 Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World As We Know It (And 
I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York City and the Unanswered 
Questions of Market and Society, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1148 (2004). 
Buildings with six or more units that were constructed between February 1, 
1974 and January 1, 1974 are subject to rent stabilization. Id. at 1148. 
DHCR promulgated and adopted the RSC in 1987; it applies to housing 
accommodations subject to regulation under the RSL. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11 (2000). 
65 The J-51 program is codified in § 11-242 of the NYC Administrative 
Code. Harold M. Shultz, Court of Appeals Delivers Final Word on Stuy 
Town, INSIDE EDGE, (Citizens Hous. & Planning Council, New York, N.Y.), 
Nov. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.chpcny.org/pubs/Court%20of%20 
Appeals%20Decides%20Stuy%20Town.pdf [hereinafter Final Word on Stuy 
Town]. 
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incentives to landlords to make certain improvements on their 
properties by promising them tax breaks.66 New York City’s 
HPD administers the J-51 program.67 
In 1993, the state legislature passed the RRRA, which 
amended the RSL.68 The RRRA enacted “luxury decontrol,” 
which refers to methods for “deregulating” a rent stabilized 
apartment and allows owners to charge market rates.69 “High 
rent high income” decontrol allows an owner to remove an 
apartment from the rent stabilization scheme when the rent is 
more than $2,000 per month and the family earns more than 
$175,000 per year.70 “High rent vacancy” decontrol allows an 
owner to remove an apartment when the rent is more than 
$2,000 per month and the unit is vacant.71  
However, the RRRA contains an exception: the luxury 
decontrol provisions do not apply to housing “which became or 
become subject to [the RRRA] . . . by virtue of receiving [J-51 
tax benefits].”72 In 1996, due to confusion over this language, 
DHCR issued an advisory opinion to clarify the luxury decontrol 
law’s interplay with the J-51 benefit, stating that the “J-51 
                                                          
66 New York, N.Y., Code § 11-243 (2008); Hannah Fons & Amy 
Blankstein, Taxing Questions: A Look at J-51 and 421-a Abatements, 
COOPERATOR: COOP & CONDO MONTHLY, available at http://www. 
cooperator.com/articles/1378/1/Taxing-Questions/Page1.html; McPherson, 
supra note 64, at 1148–49. J-51 was first created in 1955 as a means of 
encouraging landlords to provide heat and hot water but has since expanded 
to incentivize a much broader scope of renovation and rehabilitation. See 
Fons & Blankstein, supra; see also Jahr, supra note 19. It has been used in 
recent years as a means of quickly increasing rents towards the luxury 
decontrol threshold. Id. 
67 NYC Finance, J-51, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/ 
property_tax_reduc_j_51.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
68 History of the Board, supra note 62.   
69 Id. In 1997, the legislature extended rent stabilization and made certain 
modifications in the RRRA, but it did not modify the language at issue in the 
Roberts case. Id. at 37–39; see infra text accompanying notes 73–79. 
70 Final Word on Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 1. 
71 Id. 
72 Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 902 (N.Y. 
2009) (quoting RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2[a]). 
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program only precluded luxury decontrol ‘where the receipt of 
such benefits is the sole reason for the accommodation being 
subject to rent regulation.’”73  
In 2000, DHRC amended RSC’s section 2520.11 in an effort 
to again elucidate the manner in which the rent stabilization 
scheme and the J-51 tax program interacted.74 The amended 
section stated that luxury decontrol would not apply to housing 
that “became or become subject to the RSL and this 
Code . . . solely by virtue of [getting J-51 tax benefits].”75 Thus, 
the question before the court in Roberts was whether the RSC’s 
exception to luxury decontrol, as understood and administered 
by DHCR, was the proper interpretation of the 1993 RRRA.76 
The court was to determine what the language “became or 
become subject to the RSL and this Code . . . by virtue of the 
receipt of tax benefits” actually meant.77 The court considered 
                                                          
73 Id. at 903 (emphasis added by the court). The Appellate Division 
explained, “[I]t is our opinion that their apparent meaning is synonymous to 
‘by reason of’ or ‘because of,’ and that an owner is precluded from seeking 
Luxury Decontrol of a housing accommodation receiving ‘J-51’ tax abatement 
benefits only where the receipt of such benefits is the sole reason for the 
accommodation being subject to rent regulation.” Roberts v. Tishman Speyer 
Props., L.P., 874 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 918 
N.E.2d 900 (N.Y. 2009). 
74 See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 903. 
75 Id. (emphasis added by the court). The section reads, “[luxury 
decontrol] shall not apply to housing accommodations which became or 
become subject to the RSL and this Code: (i) solely by virtue of the receipt 
of tax benefits pursuant to . . . section 11-243 (formerly J51-2.5) or section 
11-244 (formerly J51-5) of the Administrative Code of the city of New York, 
as amended.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11 (2000) 
(emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 904–05. One commentator summarized the question before the 
court as follows: “The question posed by Roberts was whether a building 
receiving J-51 benefits could also take advantage of the decontrol provisions. 
The 1993 law was ambiguous on this point, and the state’s Division of 
Housing and Community Renewal interpreted the law to say that only 
buildings solely subject to rent regulation because of J-51 were prohibited 
from opting out—as opposed to buildings which took advantage of J-51 but 
were subject to rent regulation for other reasons.” Jahr, supra note 19. 
77 Harold M. Shultz, Stuy Town J-51 Decision Reversed, INSIDE EDGE, 
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two conflicting interpretations: either a building owner could not 
benefit from luxury decontrol while receiving J-51 tax 
exemptions or abatements; or a building owner could not benefit 
from luxury decontrol while receiving J-51 benefits and where 
the sole reason that the building was rent stabilized was because 
the building had entered the J-51 program.78 This distinction is 
important. Under the first view, any building receiving J-51 
benefits could not simultaneously deregulate; under the second 
view however, only buildings that became rent stabilized in 
order to receive J-51 benefits would be prevented from 
deregulation.79   
C. Majority Opinion 
The majority, finding for the Tenants, ruled the former to be 
the correct legal interpretation—no owner, regardless of the 
reason for becoming rent stabilized, was entitled to 
simultaneously enjoy the benefits of New York City’s J-51 
program and deregulation.80 The court first explained that it did 
not owe deference to DHCR’s Rent Stabilization Law 
interpretation.81 Then, the court outlined two essential bases for 
its holding. First, the Owners’ luxury control exception 
interpretation was not the most natural reading of the statute’s 
language.82 The court wrote that “[c]ontrary to [the Owners’] 
argument, there is nothing impossible, or even strained, about 
reading the verb ‘become’ to refer to achieving, for a second 
                                                          
(Citizens Hous. & Planning Council, New York, N.Y.), March 2009, 
available at http://www.chpcny.org/pubs/Stuy%20Town%20Decision%20 
Reversed.pdf (quoting RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2[a]). 
78 See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 905. 
79 Shultz, supra note 77. 
80 Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 906. 
81 Id. at 904 (“[When] the question is one of pure statutory reading and 
analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there 
is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the 
administrative agency and its interpretive regulations . . . .” (quoting 
Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459 (1980))). 
82 Id. at 906. 
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time, a status already attained.”83  
Second, the court looked to the legislative intent.84 Contrary 
to the Owners’ contention, the court found that the legislature 
did not intend to create two categories of buildings that would 
benefit from the J-51 program.85 The court cited the bill 
sponsor’s language and found that the RRRA’s legislative 
history more accurately supports the Tenants’ reading.86 The 
court reasoned that the legislative history, in light of the bill 
sponsor’s statements, makes very clear that buildings receiving 
tax exemptions such as J-51 benefits would never be allowed to 
deregulate under the luxury decontrol provisions of the RRRA.87 
The court also explained that the legislature’s failure to clarify 
DHCR’s interpretation does not demonstrate acquiescence 
because a legislature may be inactive for any number of 
reasons.88  
Just when it seemed the court had clarified that a landlord 
could not simultaneously benefit from J-51 benefits while 
                                                          
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. The Owners argued that the apartments that were stabilized before 
getting J-51 benefits would be eligible for luxury decontrol and those that 
only became stabilized as a condition of getting J-51 benefits would not be 
eligible for luxury decontrol. Id. 
86 Id. at 906–07 (“[S]hould the exemptions contained in section 489 end, 
that—those J.51s and 489s end, then they would be subject so that at no point 
do you have the [luxury] decontrol provisions applying to the buildings which 
have received the tax exemptions that I just mentioned.” (quoting N.Y. 
Senate Debate on Assembly Bill 8859, July 7, 1993, at 8213–16)). 
87 Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 906–07. While Roberts was focused on the J-
51 program, it is unclear whether other tax benefit programs may fall within 
the Roberts ruling given the court’s language: “The RRRA’s sponsor stated 
that luxury decontrol was unavailable to building owners who ‘enjoy[ed] 
another system of general public assistance” such as J-51 benefits . . . .” Id. 
at 906. 
88 Id. at 907. The court wrote that because the “practical construction” 
here can’t be said to be well known, the legislature cannot be “charged with 
knowledge of [a well-known] construction” such that the legislature’s inaction 
could be deemed acquiescence. Id. The court noted as well that there is no 
indication that the issue here was even considered the last time the legislature 
considered the statute. Id.   
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removing an apartment from rent regulation, the majority’s 
concluding sentence reflects the legal ambiguity that remains: 
“[The dire financial consequences the dissent predicts] may not 
come true; they depend, among other things, on issues yet to be 
decided, including retroactivity, class certification, the statute of 
limitations, and other defenses that may be applicable to 
particular tenants.”89 The majority then called on the legislature 
to provide relief if the statute does ultimately impose such 
“unacceptable burdens” on landlords in New York.90 
D. The Dissent 
The Roberts dissent aggressively challenged the majority’s 
methods of statutory interpretation and warned of “significant, if 
not severe dislocations in the New York City residential real 
estate industry as a result of [the] decision.”91 First, the dissent 
took issue with the majority’s statutory interpretation.92 Referring 
to the words “became or become subject to this law (a) by 
virtue of receiving J-51 benefits,” the dissent argued that if the 
legislature “had intended for all buildings receiving J-51 tax 
benefits to be exempt from luxury deregulation, it could have 
easily said just that” and the court should assume that the words 
used in a statute were inserted by the legislature for a reason.93 
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 912 (Read, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 907–09. 
93 Id. at 908 (Read, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y. 
2d 391 (1982)) (“Under well-established principles of interpretation, effect 
and meaning should be given to the entire statute and every part and word 
thereof.”). Under the dissent’s comprehension of the statute’s plain meaning, 
the court reasons that  
the buildings that ‘became or become subject to [the RSL] by virtue 
of’ receiving J-51 tax benefits passed from their former state 
(unregulated) into a new state (rent-stabilized) because of their 
owners’ receipt of these benefits. That did not happen here since the 
apartment buildings comprising Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant 
Town have been rent-regulated since at least 1974, 18 years before 
any building in either complex is alleged to have received J-51 
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Moreover, in the dissent’s view, even a generous reading of the 
verb “become” to mean “achieving, for a second time, a status 
already attained” makes the statutory terms ambiguous, certainly 
not clearly wrong as the majority implied.94 
Next, the dissent rebuts the majority’s interpretation of the 
statute’s legislative intent.95 It charges the majority with 
“pluck[ing] a snippet” from a Senate floor debate on the bill that 
eventually became the RRRA, and cautions against making 
conclusions based on such history.96 The dissent also points to 
what it calls the “most important gauge of statutory meaning,” 
which it faults the majority for failing to address at all: the 
RRRA’s sunset clause, which mandates the legislature to 
evaluate the statute’s terms.97 Given that the legislature reviewed 
the statute twice since the DHCR released its advisory opinion 
in 1996,98 it was indeed aware of the advisory decision and the 
deregulation that followed from it.99 The dissent argued that 
                                                          
benefits.  They did not ‘become’ rent-stabilized by virtue of 
receiving J-51 benefits; they already were rent-stabilized.  
Id. (citing In re KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & 
Cmty. Renewal, 5 N.Y.3d 303 (2005) (“[O]nce a building became rent-
stabilized, later, redundant statutory routes ‘would not have [been] needed’ to 
make the building subject to the RSL.”)). 
94 Id. at 904 (Read, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 910–12 (Read, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 910 (Read, J. dissenting). The dissent asserts that Senator 
Hannon’s response, which the majority uses to support their interpretation, 
does not support the court’s holding. Id. at 910–11. Instead, taken in context 
with Senator Mendez’s question, which referred only to buildings entering the 
rent stabilization program for the first time as a condition of receiving J-51 
benefits—Senator Hannon’s response did not even address buildings that 
began receiving J-51 benefits after having already been subject to rent 
stabilization, as Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village were. Id.  
97 Id. at 911 (Read, J., dissenting). 
98 Id. (Read, J., dissenting). The statute’s terms were reconsidered in 
1997 and 2003 and are to be considered for renewal in 2011. Id. 
99 Id. Pointing to DHCR’s adoption of a revised RSC, the dissent argues 
that  
the code made the DHCR’s interpretation of [the rent stabilization 
law] unmistakably clear: the exception from luxury decontrol for 
buildings receiving J-51 tax benefits covered only those buildings 
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failing to amend a statute when the practical construction is clear 
signals acquiescence on the legislature’s part.100   
Lastly, the dissent bristles at the lack of deference shown to 
DHCR’s interpretation, given its mandate to “promulgate 
regulations in furtherance of the rent control and rent 
stabilization laws.”101 The dissent writes: 
While we may not owe deference to the administrative 
agency, it should count for something that DHCR 
adopted its interpretation as a formal regulation after a 
notice-and-comment rulemaking enjoying wide 
participation by both landlord and tenant advocacy groups 
and interests.  If DHCR’s interpretation were as wide off 
the mark as the majority claims, it is odd that this 
infirmity was not discovered then.102 
In its conclusion, the dissent adopts a tone protective of the 
real estate industry and accuses the majority of minimizing 
potentially far-reaching consequences for both the defendants 
and New York City real estate industry.103 The dissent argues 
that accepted industry practice and continuity matter in the real 
estate industry and blames the majority for upsetting foundations 
upon which many business transactions have been made.104 In 
conclusion, the dissent warns that the impact of the decision will 
be even more significant given the fragility of the real estate 
market due to the housing bubble burst.105  
                                                          
rent-stabilized solely on this basis.  Yet, the Legislature in 2003 did 
not amend the RRRA to adopt the interpretation favored by 
plaintiffs, although it otherwise modified the statute.  
Id. 
100 Id. at 911–12 (citing Matter of Ansonia Residents Assn. v. New York 
State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 75 N.Y.2d 206 (N.Y. 1989); 
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 
N.Y.2d 84, 90 (1976)). 
101 Id. at 912. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 912–13. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 913. 
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E. Evaluation of the Decision 
The Roberts majority decided the case correctly, properly 
interpreting the statute at issue through a linguistic and 
legislative history analysis. It correctly decided not to address 
issues that should be outside the scope of a judicial 
determination, such as financial ramifications for the New York 
real estate industry.106  
First, the majority correctly decided that DHCR’s 
interpretation should not be given deference, given that the issue 
before the court was one of strict statutory interpretation.107 Case 
law supports this decisively: “if the regulation runs counter to 
the clear wording of a statutory provision it should not be 
accorded any weight.”108 Here, DHCR inserted the word 
“solely” where the legislature did not and therefore the 
regulation conflicts with the statute. Mere dependency on 
erroneous administrative interpretation is not a sound legal basis 
to continue relying on that erroneous interpretation.109 
Second, the language of the statute, while lacking clarity, 
simply does not state that an apartment must become stabilized 
solely by virtue of receiving tax benefits under the J-51 
program, as DHCR later amends its interpretation to read.110 
Thus, DHCR acted beyond the scope of its authority in 
essentially amending the statute.111 The Owners and the dissent 
attempt to create a post hoc distinction where there is none. 
There are no separate categories reflected in the remainder of 
                                                          
106 Id. at 912–13. 
107 Id. at 905–06. 
108 Id. (citing Kurcsics v. Merchant Mut. Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d 159, 163 
(N.Y. 1980)). 
109 Jahr, supra note 19. According to an attorney for Legal Aid, who 
submitted an amicus brief for the Tenants, “[i]f you read the statute, the 
statute’s pretty clear. The fact that DHCR, at the urging of landlords, years 
ago came out with a different position doesn’t mean the law as the legislature 
enacted it changed its meaning.” Id. 
110 See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 905. 
111 See id. In fact, the Owners concede that the word “solely” should not 
have been inserted by basing their case on the “became or become” 
language. Id. 
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the statute dictating disparate treatment for apartments that 
became stabilized because they received J-51 benefits and for 
apartments that had already been subject to stabilization.112 The 
dissent is selective in choosing when it follows a strict 
interpretation of statutory language.113 In one instance, it argues 
that each word has an exact meaning, explaining that the 
legislature would have specified that all housing receiving J-51 
benefits would be excluded from taking advantage of luxury 
decontrol, not just those that receive benefits because they 
received J-51 benefits.114 In another context, however, it excuses 
language redundancy, arguing that DHCR’s inclusion of the 
word “solely” was merely a redundancy in its regulations, not a 
change to the statute’s meaning.115  
The majority, however, appeared to stretch its logic to 
accommodate its result. The court reasons, “there is nothing 
impossible, or even strained, about reading the verb ‘become’ to 
refer to achieving, for a second time, a status already attained”116 
and in doing so ignores both the commonsense and definitional 
meanings of “become.” This flawed logic is not necessary for 
the court’s holding and should have been excluded. The “by 
virtue of” and “solely by virtue of” distinction and the 
legislative history of the statute provide a sufficiently strong 
foundation for the court’s holding that this reasoning, which has 
been criticized,117 was superfluous. 
Third, the majority writes persuasively in its analysis of the 
1993 RRRA legislative history. In citing the sponsor’s 
unambiguous language during a Senate floor exchange, the 
majority relies on the legislative source most likely to reflect the 
                                                          
112 See id. at 906. 
113 See id. at 908–09. 
114 See id. at 908. 
115 See id. at 909. 
116 Id. at 906. 
117 See Posting of Lucas A. Ferrara to New York Real Estate Lawyers’ 
Blog, http://www.nyrealestatelawblog.com/2009/10/what_do_you_think_ 
about_the_st.html (Oct. 23, 2009, 17:15 EST) [hereinafter NY Real Estate 
Lawyers’ Blog Post] (criticizing the Court’s reasoning in the Stuy Town 
Decision). 
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statute’s intent.118 The dissent wrongly focuses on the 
legislature’s inaction in the face of DHCR’s interpretation. 
Contrary case law undermines this theory. “Legislative inactivity 
is inherently ambiguous and ‘affords the most dubious 
foundation for drawing positive inference’”119 Moreover, there is 
no proof that this issue ever came to the legislature’s attention.120 
Also, the dissent’s assumption that the issue in the Roberts case 
would be considered in 1997 and 2003 simply because “battles 
over rent stabilization are among the fiercest in Albany” is 
unfounded.121 Finally, even the precedent the dissent cites 
concedes the weakness of its acquisition argument: the case to 
which the dissent cites merely calls legislative inactivity “some 
additional evidence of [the legislature’s] intention.”122 
Ultimately, the Owners and the dissent appear to put more 
weight in the stability of the real estate industry than in the letter 
of the law, and in doing so, argue that the Roberts decision is 
inequitable because of landlords’ reliance on DHCR’s 
interpretation of the statute.123 This argument is unpersuasive 
because in making this argument, the Owners subjectively judge 
the value of their potential loss to be greater than the loss 
suffered by the tenants who paid rents based on a faulty 
statutory interpretation.124 Ultimately, the majority’s focus on the 
law—as opposed to financial consequences for the real estate 
industry—provides the basis for an analysis and ruling that are 
more legally sound. 
                                                          
118 See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 906–07. The dissent’s efforts to expand 
the context in order to clarify this exchange are not insignificant, but are far 
from conclusive. Id.  
119 Id. at 907 (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310–11 
(1960)). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. at 911. 
122 Engle v. Talarico, 306 N.E.2d 796, 799 (N.Y. 1973) (emphasis 
added). 
123 See Roberts, 913 N.E.2d at 912–13. 
124 See Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 55 N.Y.2d 184, 193 (N.Y. 
1982) (finding that the unfairness to the victims of an erroneously interpreted 
statute outweighed the financial burden imposed on the party who had taken 
advantage of that improper interpretation). 
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III. THE ROBERTS DECISION’S IMPACT ON PREDATORY EQUITY  
While the tenants claim victory, debate continues as to what 
was actually won and whether or not tenants—at Stuy Town and 
in rent regulated housing across the city—will actually be better 
off after the Roberts decision. Clearly, the Roberts decision will 
apply to all tenants in apartments that have been deregulated and 
for which landlords are also receiving J-51 tax abatements.125 
Experts believe that this holding will affect up to 90,000 
apartments for which landlords simultaneously took advantage of 
J-51 benefits and luxury decontrol.126 It is believed that 27,708 
units that meet these criteria are in buildings that can be 
classified as “predatory equity” buildings. In these buildings, 
Roberts will certainly aid tenants facing aggressive—and now 
illegal—deregulation.127   
Yet, the true Roberts significance hinges on the possibility 
that the decision will reverberate across an entire industry and 
will ultimately lead to greater protections by the court or the 
legislature for an even greater number of low and middle-
income tenants. In other words, the decision will allow some 
lucky tenants to receive an unexpected windfall—back rent for 
the difference between the regulated rent and the market rate 
charged128—or, at the very least, protect them from having to 
pay market rate rents prospectively.129 The more important 
question, however, is whether the decision will help protect 
future tenants from predatory equity’s harmful effects.130 
Additionally, it is unclear whether the decision signifies a 
growing anti-owner/Wall Street investor trend among the 
courts.131 Significantly, the Court of Appeals left much to be 
                                                          
125 Final Word on Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 1. 
126 NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 2. This is out of 
354,084 units in 8,142 buildings that receive J-51 benefits. Final Word on 
Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 3. 
127 Jahr, supra note 19. 
128 Final Word on Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 3.  
129 Id. at 1. 
130 Anderson, supra note 50. 
131 NY Real Estate Lawyers’ Blog Post, supra note 117. 
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determined on remand, leaving the decision’s implications for 
the Stuy Town tenants still unknown.132 
A. The Roberts Decision’s Conflicting Views  
1. Broad Interpretation: The Decision will  
“Chill” the Predatory Equity Market  
Some believe the Roberts decision to be a landmark case133 
with significant implications for the New York City market in 
regulated rental housing. First, they believe that a broad 
interpretation of the Roberts decision could lead to a “chilling” 
effect on speculative purchases of multifamily housing because 
the scope and application of this decision are so uncertain that 
the practice of predatory equity is now too risky for private 
equity-backed developers.134 Predatory equity success relies on 
                                                          
132 See David S. Hershey-Webb & William J. Gribben, In the Wake of 
the ‘Roberts’ Decision, What’s Next?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 2009, at 4, col. 1. 
A law firm bulletin described the potential implications of the decision: “In 
addition, there may be disputes between present and prior landlords over 
liability, mortgage defaults at affected buildings and diminished services. It 
may take further litigation, regulatory action, or legislation to resolve such 
issues.” See Special Bulletin: New York State Court of Appeals Issues 
Decision in Stuyvesant Town/ Peter Cooper Village Case, Stroock & Stroock 
& Lavan LLP 2 (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.stroock.com/ 
SiteFiles/Pub848.pdf [hereinafter Special Bulletin]. 
133 Press Release, City Council Member Dan Garodnick, Re: Roberts v. 
Tishman Speyer Decision (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://stuytown 
luxliving.com/2009/03/statement-from-council-member-garodnick-re-roberts-
v-tishman-speyer-decision.html.  
134 Ilaina Jonas, Court Ruling May Cost NYC Apartment Owners Billions, 
REUTERS, Nov. 30, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
bankruptcyNews/idUSN3036333920091201; Anderson, supra note 50. The 
General Counsel to the Rent Stabilization Association has said that the 
decision exposes so many possible liabilities in the residential rental real 
estate market that there will be an immediate freeze in market activity. 
Impact of Ruling, supra note 50. Some believe that a “chilled” market and 
lack of competition will allow preservation purchasers—nonprofit 
organizations committed to keeping the housing affordable, city agencies or 
the tenants themselves—to acquire buildings and maintain their affordability, 
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the use of deregulation mechanisms, such as luxury decontrol, in 
order to remove apartments from the rent stabilization scheme 
and charge market rate rents.135 If apartments that currently 
allow owners to receive tax abatements are unable to be 
deregulated, investors—ever cautious about investing in housing 
that is, or may become, regulated—may be even less inclined to 
invest in rent regulated housing.136  
In other words, for tenants, the positive result of the Roberts 
decision may be that real estate speculation on rent regulated 
housing will decrease; a high court decision bolstering rent 
regulation could discourage subsequent rounds of speculative, 
overleveraged transactions in the residential rental housing 
market.137 A prominent New York real estate brokerage firm 
founder explains that “[w]hen an investor purchases a rent 
controlled property, they usually do so with the expectation that 
they’ll be able to convert a portion of the units to market 
rents . . . . Now those expectations have been challenged. For a 
lot of landlords, this case just eliminated their upside.”138 The 
loss of this “upside” could have enormous implications for 
developers who have used private equity to speculate on rental 
housing; it means that those involved in the already risky 
practice of predatory equity, who have purchased apartments 
that benefit from J-51 benefits, may not deregulate those 
apartments and charge market rents. Perhaps more importantly 
is the possibility that this loss of “upside” will discourage 
predatory equity transactions going forward. 
                                                          
although financing these purchases requires significant capital to which many 
nonprofits, municipal agencies and low-income tenants may not have access. 
Anderson, supra note 50. 
135
 ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., THE $20,000 STOVE: 
HOW FRAUDULENT RENT INCREASES UNDERMINE NEW YORK’S AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING 8 (2009), available at http://www.anhd.org/resources/the%20 
$20,000%20stove%20report%20on1-40th%20rent%20increase%20fraud.pdf. 
136 Daniel Geiger, Owners Scratch Their Heads As Tenants Beat the 
System, REAL EST. WKLY., Oct. 28, 2009, at 3, 27, available at http://www. 
masseyknakal.com/news/pdf/633924219561898750.pdf [hereinafter Tenants 
Beat System] (emphasis added). 
137 Id.  
138 Id. (emphasis added). 
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There is also the possibility that the scope of Roberts is not 
necessarily limited to the 90,000 units that are eligible for J-51 
benefits and have been deregulated, or even the 350,000 J-51 
units that receive J-51 benefits.139 Even the Roberts court, 
despite its focus on J-51 benefits and its related statutes, 
acknowledged that the finding could apply to other types of tax 
benefits.140 Courts may find that landlords received other tax 
abatements improperly while taking advantage of deregulation.141 
The case could have enormous implications on the number of 
claims brought and therefore, the decision’s overall impact.142 
Lenders and investors may also balk at the prospect of offering 
funds for improvements with uncertainty around the owners’ 
ability to successfully recoup their investment.143 In fact, some 
investors appear to have already been affected144 and the banking 
industry has indicated that Roberts could affect as much as $5.8 
billion in loans and deter investors from pursuing rent stabilized 
                                                          
139 See Anderson, supra note 50. 
140 Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 906 (N.Y. 
2009). The court writes, “[t]he RRRA’s sponsor stated that luxury decontrol 
was unavailable to building owners who ‘enjoy[ed] another system of general 
public assistance’ such as J-51 benefits.” Id. 
141 See Special Bulletin, supra note 132, at 2. As Leonard Boxer, one of 
the leading real estate lawyers in the city explained in this client bulletin: 
The implications of this decision are likely to be far reaching, not 
only for other landlords and tenants in a similar predicament, but 
also for lenders, investors and for the residential real estate market 
in general.  While this decision deals only with J-51, entering into 
any tax exemption program could significantly limit the use of your 
property in ways that may not be predictable.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
142 Press Release, Harry Heching & Paul Watkins, Flash: New York 
State’s Court of Appeals Holds Tax Breaks Preclude Rent Decontrol (Oct. 
28, 2009), available at http://www.dwpv.com/en/17620_24362.aspx. 
143 Impact of Ruling, supra note 50. 
144 Sam Chandan, Investors and Stuy Town, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 
2009, available at http://neptune.observer.com/2009/commercial-observer/ 
investors-and-stuy-town#. The predatory equity model depends in large part 
on securitization of the debt taken to finance the purchase. EVOLUTION OF A 
CRISIS, supra note 24, at 12–13.  
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properties in the future.145 
In addition, the Roberts decision could suggest two judicial 
trends as courts adjudicate disputes over transactions that were 
executed at the height of the housing bubble. First, the Roberts 
decision could signal a shift away from pro-landlord rent 
regulation and deregulation rulings.146 The possibility that this 
ruling was based, at least in part, on ideology—a disapproval of 
private equity’s involvement in the New York rent regulated 
housing market, for example—is certain to give private equity-
backed developers pause before making similar ventures into the 
regulated housing market.147 Second, the decision could 
demonstrate the court’s willingness to disregard longtime 
industry practices if a court believes that doing so is necessary 
to reach the proper legal result, as it did here in invalidating 
DHCR’s application of J-51 law.148 The court ignored the long-
held and widespread view that DHCR’s interpretation was 
legally correct149 and invalidated that interpretation with the 
stroke of a pen.150 Consequently, developers and their counsel 
could approach similarly structured real estate deals with much 
greater caution than they did before the Roberts case was 
decided.151 This fear adds to the shadow of uncertainty that 
Roberts casts over the industry and market.152 
 
                                                          
145 The Next Stuyvesant Town? Deutsche Bank Report Examines Fallout, 
WALL ST. J. (Developments Blog), Dec. 1, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
developments/2009/12/01/the-next-stuyvesant-town-deutsche-bank-report-
examines-fallout/ [hereinafter The Next Stuyvesant Town]. 
146 NY Real Estate Lawyers’ Blog Post, supra note 117.  
147 The Next Stuyvesant Town, supra note 145. 
148 Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 907 (N.Y. 
2009). The court simply dismisses the claim that a longtime practice should 
be upheld on the grounds that it is a longtime practice and that a change in 
that practice will require parties to expend significant effort, expense and that 
future litigation is certain. Id.  
149 Tenants Beat System, supra note 136, at 3.  
150 Jahr, supra note 19. 
151 See Special Bulletin, supra note 132.   
152 Id. 
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2. Narrow Interpretation: The Roberts Decision  
Will Have a Limited Effect on Predatory Equity 
The Roberts decision also evokes the alternate view that the 
court’s strict holding is likely to have only a negligible effect on 
New York City’s predatory equity.153 In other words, the 
decision appears to expressly impact only those property owners 
who simultaneously took advantage of J-51 tax abatements and 
deregulation.154 The ruling, therefore, is most likely limited to a 
maximum of 90,000 apartments in New York City, less than 
30,000 of which are in buildings considered to be predatory 
equity purchases.155 While significant, such low numbers on their 
own are not substantial enough to ward off future predatory 
equity purchases, especially in light of the fact that now owners 
can simply forego J-51 benefits and reap the great rewards of 
deregulation.156 
In addition, under this narrow view it is very unlikely that 
the Roberts decision foreshadows a broad, liberal, anti-
owner/investor trend on the part of courts. To the contrary, the 
case is based strictly on an issue of statutory interpretation.157 
                                                          
153 Landlords will Survive Stuy-town Verdict, supra note 20. 
154 Id.; see also Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3. 
155 NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13 at 2; Jahr, supra note 
19. 
156 Assuming that the Stuy Town Tenants collect the $215 million they 
wish to recover for back rent, Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3, the 
Owners could have saved $181 million by simply foregoing the $24 million 
they received as tax abatements through the J-51 program. See Charles V. 
Bagli, Court Deals Blow to Owners of Apartment Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/nyregion/23stuy 
town.html?_r=1. This math will likely deter like-minded property owners 
from entering the J-51 program in the future. 
157 See Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 906 
(N.Y. 2009). The decision reads:  
Here, we conclude that defendants’ interpretation of the exception to 
luxury control for units that “became or become” subject to rent 
stabilization . . . conflicts with the most natural reading of the 
statute’s language . . . . Contrary to PCV/ST’s and MetLife’s 
argument, there is nothing impossible, or even strained, about 
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Given the ruling’s narrow language, courts will only be bound 
by the decision when exclusively addressing the interplay of J-51 
tax abatements and simultaneous deregulation.   
This decision could simply be a product of its times; it did, 
after all, come in the midst of a severe recession that followed 
the greed and audacity of a boom time. If the justices were, in 
fact, tinged by ideology, their holding is not likely to be applied 
by future courts in such a manner that it becomes a truly 
influential decision. Future courts will be vigilant to ensure that 
their decisions are based on the law, not ideology.  
B. Roberts’ Impact on Predatory Equity will be Negligible  
Ultimately, the Roberts court’s narrow holding indicates that 
this case, while significant, will not be instrumental in bringing 
about the demise of predatory equity. As such, the case is a 
source of false hope for those who believed that it would 
represent a seismic shift in New York residential real estate law. 
While the tenants in this case have prevailed against Stuy Town, 
there are a number of reasons why the tenant movement should 
not claim victory just yet.   
First, despite speculation that this decision could chill the 
predatory equity market temporarily,158 it does not appear to be 
doing so.159 The narrow holding regarding just the J-51 program 
does not appear to be deterring vulture investors seeking 
distressed properties,160 and is not likely to prevent private equity 
                                                          
reading the verb “become” to refer to achieving, for a second time, 
a status already attained. Even assuming that the reading given to 
‘became or become’ by PCV/ST and MetLife is a possible one, the 
RRRA’s legislative history better supports our interpretation of the 
statute.  
Id. 
158 See supra Part III.A.1.  
159 EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 21. Instead, the banks 
selling the debt seem to be waiting to determine the market value of the 
buildings and loans so that they do not sell the assets for less than they could 
soon be worth if the market ends up recovering. Id. 
160 Id. Although they preceded the Roberts decision, there have been 
recent sales of predatory equity properties to owners with histories of 
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investors from getting involved again once the housing market 
rebounds.161 Second, the ruling—which focuses almost 
exclusively on statutory language and legislative intent—debunks 
the notion that this decision reflects a new populist trend 
whereby ideologically motivated judges will punish investors and 
developers.162  
Third, there are important socioeconomic differences 
between Stuy Town residents and other predatory equity 
building residents. The Roberts decision will not affect many 
buildings that are predatory equity victims because the buildings 
are located in neighborhoods where the rents are much less than 
the $2,000 mark that allows owners to deregulate the unit.163 
Thus, many predatory equity victims live in apartments that 
have become more expensive, but have not been deregulated and 
may not be for quite some time.164 Moreover, most of the 
                                                          
speculation and tenant harassment. Id. at 21. One example that worries tenant 
advocates is a speculative purchase made by the Orbach Group of debt held 
by Deutsche Bank in March, 2009 on overleveraged buildings owned by The 
Pinnacle Group. Id.; see also Massey Knakal, Commercial Mortgage Alert, 
Mar., 27, 2009, available at http://www.masseyknakal.com/news/pdf/ 
633737690628258682.pdf. The Association for Neighborhood and Housing 
Development explains:  
[I]t is our assessment that a 40 percent discount would leave the 
building far less overleveraged, although still somewhat in excess of 
the building’s actual income-based value. This suggests that the 
lender, Deutsche Bank, now has a more realistic model of how rent-
regulated buildings in New York City should be underwritten. 
However, there are grave concerns about the Orbach Group as 
purchaser of the mortgage, as evidence suggests that it has a history 
of managing buildings with the same speculative approach and 
harassing tactics as the worst of the predatory equity developers. 
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 21. 
161 EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 20. 
162 Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 906–07 
(N.Y. 2009). 
163 WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 11.   
164 Id. While the rent can be raised rapidly due to a 20% vacancy bonus 
and the owner’s ability to charge one dollar more per month for every forty 
dollars spent on improvements, in many cases, the rent will remain under 
$2,000. Id. 
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predatory equity victims are low-income tenants, unlike Stuy 
Town’s middle-class tenants, and lack the political clout that 
comes from living in such a famous, historic and symbolic 
housing complex situated in the heart of Manhattan. Low-
income tenants may be more easily coerced into giving up their 
legal rights and abandoning their homes due to financial 
concerns, lack of knowledge of their rights or because of their 
status as undocumented immigrants.165 Such tenants are less 
likely to initiate expensive litigation like the Owners faced in 
Roberts.  
Fourth, there is a chance that the backlash from this well-
publicized case could prompt the New York State Legislature to 
accept the Roberts court’s express invitation to amend the RSL 
and essentially undo the Roberts decision.166 The decision invites 
those it knew would be angered by its ruling to do so: “If the 
statute imposes unacceptable burdens, defendants’ remedy is to 
seek legislative relief.”167   
Fifth, it is likely that property owners will simply forego the 
benefits received through the J-51 program. Although these 
benefits are not insubstantial, they pale in comparison to the 
                                                          
165 PRATT CTR. FOR CMTY. DEV. & N.Y. IMMIGRANT HOUS. 
COLLABORATIVE, CONFRONTING THE HOUSING SQUEEZE: CHALLENGES 
FACING IMMIGRANT TENANTS, AND WHAT NEW YORK CAN DO 16 (2008), 
available at http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/publications/Confronting% 
20the%20Housing%20Squeeze.pdf. 
166 Richard A. Epstein, The Scourge of Rent Stabilization, FORBES.COM, 
Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/02/rent-stabilization-tishman-
speyer-peter-cooper-stuyvesant-opinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html. 
“[I]t is not as though the tenants have won anything tangible . . . for their 
Pyrrhic victory guarantees only further litigation on such technical subjects as 
class certification, measure of damages and statutes of limitation—unless of 
course the state legislature accepts the Court’s invitation by undoing the 
Roberts decision.” Id. Given the New York State Democrats’ current control 
of the legislative and executive branches, such legislation is not, however, 
likely to be imminent. See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, Espada Promises the Repeal 
of Vacancy Decontrol and More, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 26, 2009, available 
at http://www.observer.com/2009/politics/espada-promise-repeal-vacancy-
decontrol. 
167 Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 907. 
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money an owner stands to make from a deregulated apartment.168   
Sixth, the decision could actually harm tenants at Stuy Town 
and across the city more than it helps them.169 Many “predatory 
equity” properties, including Stuy Town, are already debt-laden 
and on the path toward foreclosure. This decision, and any 
damages owners would be forced to pay, could actually make 
conditions worse for tenants.170 “In the end, while the decision 
may provide monetary benefits to tenants in the short run, it 
may also prove to have a profoundly negative effect on the 
buildings and neighborhoods in which the affected units are 
located.”171 For example, there is a possibility that landlords will 
                                                          
168 Epstein, supra note 166. 
169 Id. 
170 Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants Huge Victory, supra note 21 (“‘This 
decision is going to push building owners to the wall,’ said Patrick Siconolfi, 
executive director of Community Housing Improvement Program, a group 
that represents landlords. ‘And that’s not good for anybody, because we need 
buildings to flourish for New York to flourish.’”). The impact of foreclosure 
on renters is beyond the scope of this Comment, but has been addressed in 
detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: 
Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
171 Special Bulletin, supra note 132. While this may be true, there is an 
almost universal sentiment that predatory equity has caused many hardships 
for—if not the complete displacement of—many tenants in these 
neighborhoods, so it is difficult to evaluate which scenario is “worse.” 
According to Joe Strasburg, president of the city’s Rent Stabilization 
Association, which represents 25,000 owners of rent stabilized apartments: 
This ruling leaves more questions unanswered than the questions it 
addressed and, quite frankly, it raises new and alarming questions 
for both owners and tenants . . . . This court decision has the 
potential to force buildings into bankruptcy or foreclosure if owners 
are required to roll back rents. This would not only create chaos in 
the affordable housing industry, it would have a cascading 
detrimental effect on the New York City budget because property tax 
rolls would have to be adjusted lower—which would cripple an 
already financially struggling City during this economic crisis.  
Tenants Beat System, supra note 136, at 3, 27. Others have noted that the 
ruling could decrease the city’s tax revenues given that landlords’ rent rolls 
determine the amount they must pay in taxes. Court Hands Stuy Town 
Tenants Huge Victory, supra note 21. 
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decide to simply avoid necessary renovations now that a 
significant incentive—the J-51 abatement—would preclude the 
significant benefits of deregulation.172  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are a number of deterrents for future predatory equity 
investments in New York City: newly enacted tenant protection 
legislation, an active, organized and vocal tenant-rights 
movement with increasing success fighting harassment, elected 
officials who are willing to expend political capital fighting this 
battle for their constituents, the burst of the housing bubble, the 
pending crisis in the commercial mortgage-backed securities 
markets and now the Roberts decision and its impact in 
hastening the downfall of the most prominent and expensive real 
estate deals in history.173 In fact, the Roberts decision impacts 
about one-third of all units in predatory equity buildings.174 Yet, 
despite all of these deterrents, activity in the market for 
predatory equity properties continues, albeit in a slightly more 
moderate form.175 In other words, the deterrents, including 
Roberts, are insufficient; the persistence of predatory equity 
demonstrates the belief, on the part of investors and developers, 
                                                          
172 Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants Huge Victory, supra note 21. “‘It 
renders J-51 tax benefits useless,’ said David Kuperberg, chief executive of 
Cooper Square Realty, the city’s largest residential property manager, a firm 
that also has an ownership stake in about a dozen buildings with rent 
stabilized-units in the city. ‘It is a disincentive for landlords to upgrade 
properties.’” Id.  
173 See WATERS, supra note 8. 
174 Jahr, supra note 19. According to Jahr’s article, 27,708 of the 90,000 
apartments that have been purchased through a predatory equity model have 
been deregulated while the owner has simultaneously received J-51 benefits. 
Id. Even this high percentage of impacted units does not appear to be 
deterring future investors from making purchases in this sector. See id. 
175 See EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 21. Note that this 
activity preceded the Roberts Court of Appeals decision but followed the 
Appellate Division decision. Therefore, the potential for such a holding has 
been clear to the developers continuing to pursue predatory equity deals.  
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that such deals are not only rational, but profitable.176  
The second, more “moderate” phase of predatory equity is 
characterized by more moderate overleveraging, but 
overleveraging nonetheless. While the implications of the 
economic slump and the Roberts ruling have yet to fully emerge, 
it seems clear that investors are still willing to buy distressed 
properties at a discount in the hopes of using predatory equity 
strategies to turn a profit. The Roberts decision’s narrow holding 
appears to have done very little to thwart such efforts.  
Ultimately, legislation, political pressure and market forces 
may actually pose a much greater threat to predatory equity 
investment than any court decision. There are numerous bills 
pending in state legislatures that could prevent predatory equity 
investment more effectively than the Roberts decision by 
strengthening rent regulation and, thus, removing the benefit of 
investing in regulated housing with the intention of someday 
charging market rents.177 Federal legislation has also been 
introduced to curb new predatory equity purchases and to soften 
existing deals’ harmful impacts on tenants and banks.178 New 
York City recently announced a “Predatory Equity Task Force” 
to “respond to foreclosures around the city, and find creative 
new policies to prevent problems before they escalate.”179 
                                                          
176 See id. at 20–22. 
177 See, e.g., A02005, Assem. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly. 
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02005 (proposing to repeal provisions of luxury 
decontrol); A02002, Assem. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state. 
ny.us/leg/?bn=A02002 (proposing to increase civil penalties for types tenant 
harassment); A01688 Assem. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state. 
ny.us/leg/?bn=A01688 (proposing to repeal the Urstadt Law); A00860, 
Assem., (N.Y. 2009) (proposing to increase the threshold levels for luxury 
decontrol to account for inflation), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/ 
leg/?bn=A00860. 
178 TARP for Main Street Act of 2009, H.R. 3068, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.3068:. 
179 Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., Mayor Bloomberg, 
Senator Schumer, Congressman Serrano, Speaker Quinn and Fannie Mae 
Announce Housing Developer Led by Mo Vaughn Will Purchase Troubled 
South Bronx Housing Portfolio (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/hpd/html/pr2009/pr-12-02-09.shtml. It seems unlikely, however, 
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Finally, the financial meltdown exposed systemic problems in 
the commercial mortgage backed securities market that could 
hinder deals of this magnitude from being made.180 These forces 
could confront predatory equity much more effectively than the 
judiciary ever could.   
The Roberts decision is significant because it demonstrates 
the ability of tenants to make current owners account for rent 
overcharges and to deter investors from using an already-risky 
investment strategy. Other tenants and their lawyers have 
already used the Roberts decision as a basis for claims, and 
more claims will certainly follow.181 Unfortunately for tenants 
                                                          
that this task force will have the mandate to implement any significant 
prophylactic measures; takings clause and contract challenges are legal 
hurdles for policy makers and tenant advocates whose ideal solution would be 
to guarantee that purchasers of multifamily rental housing be committed to 
maintaining affordability. See Maria Cristiano Anderson, Solutions to the 
Crisis in Affordable Housing: A Proposed Model for New York City, 3 
RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 84 (2005); Nat’l Hous. Law Project, A Brief 
Review of State and Local Preservation Purchase Laws, 36 HOUSING L. 
BULL. 217, 223 (2006), available at http://www.nhlp.org/files/Pres% 
20Purchase%20Rts%20(Nov%20Dec%2006).pdf. 
180 Sam Chandan, Investors and Stuy Town, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 
2009, available at http://neptune.observer.com/2009/commercial-observer/ 
investors-and-stuy-town#. 
Given the struggling commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) 
market, it is unclear whether predatory equity deals of the magnitude made 
during the housing bubble could even be executed.  Chandan explains: 
Apart from the specifics of last week’s decision, a default of the 
magnitude and visibility of the Stuyvesant Town loans bears 
implications for a broader class of investors’ perceptions of risk in 
holding CMBS exposure. 
. . .  
Confounding efforts to rebuild confidence in securitization, many 
investors will view a prospective default at Stuyvesant Town as a 
result of systemic issues in the CMBS market that have yet to be 
properly addressed, and not just as an asset-specific issue.  
Id. 
181 Theresa Agovino, Big Development Hit with Stuy-Town Ruling 
Fallout, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Nov. 16, 2009, available at http://www. 
crainsnewyork.com/article/20091116/FREE/911169987 (noting that 11 
tenants at a building complex called London Terrace Gardens recently sued 
SPIRER REVISED.DOC 6/28/2010  3:43 PM 
892 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
and their advocates, investors continue to seek investment 
opportunities in the regulated residential real estate market, 
albeit with a modified and slightly more realistic model. The 
Roberts decision will certainly add to New York State’s 
“impenetrable thicket” of rent laws, but it does not impose 
significant enough burdens on landlords and developers to 
precipitate the demise of predatory equity.  
                                                          
their landlord on the same grounds the plaintiffs used in Roberts; the lawyer 
for the tenants has said that he is working on filing suits on these grounds in 
other buildings as well). 
